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1 Introduction 
Hidden Voices by Rosemary Butcher 
My presentation starts from a number of practical questions, each of which, if 
we unpack it, brings with it a number of theoretical perspectives, issues and enquiries.  
One such question has a precise empirical focus, which is how to establish a digital 
archive, working with the practitioner herself, in the case of thirty years of Rosemary 
Butcher’s making new ‘choreographic’ work, where a complication is added, which is 
that the practitioner herself continues to make new work in the time of archive 
production.  This is new work that the act of archive production itself might have its 
impact upon.   
I am supposing that some of the problems thrown up by this particular exercise 
of archive production might have implications for archive production in the performing 
arts more generally, not least because the Rosemary Butcher undertaking is positioned 
quite explicitly in the context of performing arts practice-led-research (and generously 
funded in large part by the AHRC).  My own research has focused in recent years on 
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the question of expert practitioner-specific modes of knowledge and models of 
intelligibility, on performance-making processes as distinct from the practices of 
spectating, and on the issue of what might be called the ‘signature practices’ of the 
expert practitioner.  Against this backdrop, a further set of questions is bound up with 
the issue of digital archive production.   
First, how might we identify, document and archive disciplinary specificity, in 
performance-making practices, as distinct from the practices of expert spectating, upon 
which much performance-documentation tends to be modelled?  What is at stake in this 
question is the issue of the university’s failure, over recent decades, to engage 
theoretically with disciplinary specificity as such, in contrast with the widely preferred 
and marketable ‘interdisciplinarity’.  Second, what are the identifiers of signature 
practice, in the named expert practitioner, when and where do they emerge, and can 
they be/how might they be documented?  Third, what constitutes performance-making 
expertise and is it the case, as I sense that it might be, that we know it when we see it, in 
the university, rather better than we know how to instruct others to identify it?  The 
expression ‘as I sense it might be’, that I have  just used, signals the tentative and 
speculative nature of my own enquiry and expertise here, and I am flagging up, in case 
there are any ‘hard-edge’ e-scientists amongst us, the wholly fuzzy nature of my 
certainties.  I am setting up the formula, ‘as I sense that it might be’, to represent a 
major model of intelligibility that is central to the ways of knowing in this particular 
field of practice.  
I want to ask, in addition, who and on the basis of what sort of competence and 
artistry, does and should document and archive expert performance-making practices, 
in a practice-led-research context? My question here provides a basis for arguing for 
the need for our recognition of the disciplinary expertise and indeed the virtuosity of the 
IT-practitioner-archivist:  I want to insist on the need for us to acknowledge that, like 
the expert arts practitioner and the expert performance researcher, the digital archivist 
is similarly expert.  But what this shared expertise means in terms of practice, is that all 
three of us, as experts in our disciplines, tend to make decisions via the operations of a 
discipline-specific expert intuition.  On this basis, I will proceed to argue that it is time 
for us to identify expert-intuitive processing in expert decision-making as such, in order 
to master some of its implications, not least for archiving in the present context.   
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1.1 The State of Things 
I have observed over the past decade that enquiry into none of these four – 1. 
disciplinary specificity, 2. disciplinary expertise, 3. expert making practices (rather than 
spectatorial, interpretative practices), and 4. expert-intuitive decision-making – has 
been central to the ways the performing arts have been practised theoretically, over the 
past three decades, in much of the older university.  So thoroughgoing is this omission, 
that we might well need to accuse ourselves of wholesale erasure – even marginalisation 
– of something that I am viewing as constitutive of making, in the performing arts 
disciplines.  The question which follows, is whether digital archive production linked to 
the recent history of the performing arts can do anything other than to replicate, in the 
archive produced, precisely that erasure of data specific to disciplinary specificity, 
disciplinary expertise, and performance-making processes rather than spectatorial 
practices and their secondary processing.   
Where spectator-positioning, the times of spectating, and spectator-based 
interpretations are documented, rather than performance-making processes, I am 
arguing that certain models of intelligibility apply to making sense in the field; that 
these are naturalised and widely reproduced in many performing arts programmes in 
the university, despite the fact that these very models of intelligibility work against the 
sorts of changes that some of us have been calling for over the past few years in the case 
of performing arts practices-as-research.  I am asking, overall, what our options might 
be, in archive-production, if the data that a shift in perspective and positioning to the 
making processes would require, were historically unavailable – as is certainly the case 
in part for the Rosemary Butcher archive. 
 
1.2 ‘Set-up’: between ‘practice’ and ‘context’ 
Before I go any further, I want to introduce another term which I am going to 
argue is bound-up with these opening questions, and has been implicit in the ways I 
have used a number of terms: that is, I am interested in the ‘set-up’, or ‘set-ups’ that 
apply in the performing arts, and that tend to regulate the ways that notions like 
disciplinary specificity, disciplinary expertise, and performance-making practices - as 
distinct from ‘the show’ - are understood.  To bring these perspectives together, and to 
relate them furthermore to the issue of memory and the archive, I have effectively 
implied that the ‘set-up’ within which digital archive production is more generally 
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undertaken will tend to perpetuate dominant and naturalised ways of seeing and doing, 
with regard to performance, in the university, unless and until we bring what is specific 
to practitioner-centred performance disciplines explicitly into account.   
In order to underline what is at stake here, I want to make a clear distinction of 
an operative kind between the relational set-up specific to expert performance-making, 
on the one hand, and on the other the event-specific relational set-up, which is that 
bringing together the performers and spectators, in the performance event itself.  It’s 
banal to observe that these are wholly different; but the implications of that difference 
are often overlooked when we use the term ‘performance’, as though it were stable and 
its implications generally shared.  In general terms, it happens that while the expert 
practitioner can expertly imagine the relational set-up of the performance event, and 
takes the detail of that imagining into account in terms of her compositional decision-
making, it is not the case that a spectator has the means to similarly imagine what is 
specific to performance-making.  Whereas even expert spectating requires no 
professional expertise to flourish, and its activities can be assimilated into the everyday, 
expert and discipline specific performance-making, where signature is involved, 
requires a competence and a mastery that others have called ‘extra-daily’.  It remains 
the case, nonetheless, that in many university courses some of us teach students to 
mistake performance effects for performance-making causes, and/or to try to guess at 
the latter.  Let’s not continue to perpetuate this; but to change, we should need to 
recognise that expertise tends not to be democratically available. 
As long as the role of the informed spectator continues to proliferate in the 
university, performance-documentation, as an activity that tends to make ‘data’ 
available to digital archiving, will tend in turn to focus on and even to prefer to capture 
product; to focus on ‘the production’, and on the times and spaces of spectating in the 
performance event, rather than on performance-making.  On this basis, as far as the 
older university at least is concerned, not only will disciplinary expertise, operating in 
terms of externally-validated arts community values, tend to be omitted from expert 
documentation, but so too will be the debate on performance aesthetics in practice.   Yet 
no academic, in my own experience, fails to make judgements of taste and value in her 
or his own performance-going.  On this sort of basis, I am going to argue that perhaps 
some of us know not (or will not say, in the theory seminar) what we do.  But the quite 
particular relational set-ups specific to the disciplines, within which material is 
produced and evaluated, can only be ‘understood’, ‘captured’ and ‘documented’, it 
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seems to me, to the extent that their role in expert performance production is explicitly 
identified as such in advance, and secondly to the extent that the archivist is in a 
position to realign her activities with those specific to expert performance-making 
processes.   
 
1.3 Expertise’s place 
Expertise seems to be ‘held’, and to be internalised, in such a way that others can 
only see it in the quality of its enactments.  In identifying one aspect of expert 
performance-making as an internalised mastery of multiple major and minor 
mechanisms, which come into operation at all of those points where signature practices 
are articulated and synthesised, by an expert practitioner, and in terms of ‘the new’, I 
am calling for a realignment of documentation, away from product and into decision-
making processes, where that complex of processes and the challenges it presents is 
explicitly targeted.  That the complex of processes I have described tends to prioritise 
the operations of expert intuition, along with a whole series of constantly renewed 
evaluative mechanisms, and that these operations tend, as far as documentation is 
concerned, to be invisible as such, should be seen as no more than an intriguing 
challenge for those of us who work in documentation and archive production. 
I am arguing that in the absence of a set-up-specific, performance-meta-
theoretical and archive-meta-theoretical undertaking, however, the older university’s 
attempts at documentation and preservation of data have tended historically, and may 
well continue to be reactive to models of intelligibility, including evaluative mechanisms, 
which default to university-established ways of seeing and doing.  I have identified those 
established ways of seeing and doing, in the past, as specific to what I have called a 
closet Spectator Studies which masquerades – often in order to market the degree 
programme effectively - as Performance Studies. 
Finally I propose to raise very briefly the matter of the nature and degree of 
impact of ‘media-theoretical’ and mediological discourses on the work of the expert IT 
practitioners involved in archive production, from the viewpoint I have adopted, which 
is that in my experience, decisions-made, in the hands-on digital arena, tend to be 
strongly characterised by trial and error, by an art of making-do, as well as by the 
operations of expert intuition.  I want to raise in my presentation the issue of the 
creative expertise of the IT practitioner, within the set-up specific to archive production, 
arguing that an account of the IT practitioner’s expertise and discipline-specific 
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invention is, similarly, often erased from media-theoretical as well as digital 
performance studies discourses in the university. 
 
2 Practising a theoretical shift 
2.1 How to theorise in practice, in the context of archival in(ter)vention in the Performing 
Arts? 
In my introduction I have hinted at the role of a number of different ‘set-ups’, 
specific to performing arts in the wider community, to the university, and to digital 
capture and uses for the purposes of archive production.  I have suggested that these 
determine different ways of seeing, knowing, doing and evaluation – and of a discourse 
production that tends to renew precisely those set-ups.  Much of the university, despite 
its own declared interest in interdisciplinarity, seems to me to continue to be dominated 
by disciplinary difference operating at a micrological, as well as naturalised, rather than 
open level: indicatively, the discourses and other practices specific to the discipline of 
Contemporary European Philosophy differ markedly from those specific to Cultural 
Studies and differ again from those preferred in Performance Studies and/or 
Performing Arts.  These differences are revealed, as far as discourse is concerned, in 
terms of the preferred range of thematisations, the nature of the generalisations specific 
to the discourse; the ways analytical subject and object are understood; the degree of 
importance attributed to verifiable evidence in the field; the role of the discipline-
specific meta-discourse, and the range and types of tropes central to its operations.  
Indicatively,  while it is common enough to find practitioners in Performing Arts 
talking about ‘integrity’ – for which it is relatively difficult to identify an evidential  
basis – Performance Studies in the late 20thC model often challenged traditional 
humanist concerns, and preferred to adopt discursive positioning associated with what 
has been called the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ (Ricoeur 1970). 
I am going to argue, on the basis of differences of this sort, that documentation 
and archive production might need to be alert to the different agendae associated with 
these different positionings.  Ideally, the document-maker and IT practitioner will be at 
least alert to some of these issues, and may manage, thereby, to avoid modes of 
production that simply default to the reactive, the habitual, and the commonsensical.  It 
has sometimes been the case, in my experience at least, that discipline-specific 
difficulties, in the performance-maker’s work, will be met by skilled problem-solving 
strategies in the archive-maker. 
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2.2 Epistemics and epistemic cultures 
My overall approach here is epistemic, where by epistemics I am signalling a 
focus on “knowledge-centred practices”, “epistemic objects”, and the “models of 
intelligibility” that apply to these, in particular set-ups.  “Epistemic objects”, in the 
words of practice-theorist Karin Knorr-Cetina (2000), are those that “bind[…] experts 
to knowledge things in creative and constructive practice[s]” (182).  What Knorr Cetina 
understands by a ‘knowledge-thing’ is revealed in her account of “epistemic cultures”, 
which are 
amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms – bonded through affinity, necessity 
and historical coincidence – which, in a given field, make up how we know what 
we know. 
 
“Epistemic cultures”, she adds, “create and warrant knowledge”, and the analysis she 
proposes is one that explores “the meaning of the empirical, the enactments of object 
relations, [and] the construction and fashioning of social arrangements” within a 
disciplinary field (Knorr Cetina, 1999).  On this sort of basis, I want to make a 
distinction between Performance Studies in the university as an epistemic sub-culture - 
with its own preferred epistemic objects – and the epistemic sub-culture that applies in 
the wider arts-productive  performance communities.  On the basis of that distinction, 
my suggestion is that it remains to those of us who operate between the two, to identify 
what is specific to and of central importance in each, not least if we are concerned with 
performance archive production and with what, when we bring the digital archive into 
the equation, we might want to highlight.   
In these sorts of terms, I am identifying ‘the expert or professional practitioner’, 
‘performance mastery and expertise’, ‘performance-making practices’, the ‘operations 
of expert intuition’, ‘the ‘logics of production’, ‘the externally-ratified performance 
event’, and ‘expert performance-making documentation’ as examples of “knowledge-
centred” and “knowledge-producing” epistemic objects, many of which have tended, 
over the first 20 or so years of Performance Studies in the UK and American 
universities, to have been largely sidestepped in published Performance Studies writing. 
This sidestepping has occurred for reasons which are historically interesting and linked 
to attempts within the newly emerging discipline to combine the academic with the 
market-appeal of performance.   
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The relatively recent shift to practice-as-research in Performing Arts in the 
British university has led to an increase in overlap between the different sub-cultures 
identified, but not without producing a new set of difficulties.  The expert practitioner 
entering the university tends to bear the burden of some of these difficulties.  As soon as 
a third set-up is introduced – such as that brought by digital archive production - those 
of us who are performance specialists, in either of the subcultures I have identified, 
need to insist that the default to commonsense-based approaches to documentation is 
unhelpful, to the extent that it produces a digital archive that cedes to the discursively 
dominant sub-culture of Performance Studies in the university.  What is needed, 
instead, of the university, is a theorised meta-archival undertaking, which involves a 
praxiological engagement – by which I mean a political intervention through critical 
practice into established practices.  On the basis of that sort of critical intervention, 
university-based theorists might begin at least to try to catch up with creative 
collaborations, including the archival, already happening outside of their doors or on 
their doorsteps.    
 
2.3 Discipline, signature practices, and singularity  
I want at this point to begin to identify some of the flash-points where differences 
in the ways ‘performance’ is approached in the different sub-cultures I have identified 
are acute, if our concern is with positioning in regard to our object, and with the 
intelligibility models or ways of seeing and understanding that apply: I have already 
suggested that expert performance making-processes differ so significantly from what is 
available to spectators under the same title, that I might need, prior to working on 
archive production, to determine which ‘knowledge orders’, and which subjects and 
objects, are proper to our task.  It is on this basis that I am providing the present 
empirical focus on the ‘Rosemary Butcher’ archive. 
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My first observation concerning  disciplinary specificity is given away by my use 
of the name itself: ‘Rosemary Butcher’ is less a name, in the everyday sense, than short-
hand for a widely established practitioner-signature, and whatever it is that constitutes 
that signature is encoded in her work in terms of what I am calling ‘signature 
practices’.  By ‘signature practices’, I am asserting something quite complex: in the case 
of the particularities of Butcher’s signature, while much of her work seems to retain the 
disciplinary markers of dance, while it is produced through choreographic process and 
draws on highly trained expert performers; and while it operates in terms of an 
Hidden Voices by Rosemary Butcher 
 
engagement with the production values that apply in the wider arts communities, 
‘something in’ that work is equally recognisable as hers.   As is implied by ‘her work’, 
signature has a legal status, and cannot be replicated without offending against 
intellectual property ownership - whereas ‘style’, with which signature is sometimes 
confused, is endlessly copyable.   The Rosemary Butcher ‘something’ is singular, but 
equally it is recognisable; it is widely identified as such, in disciplinary terms and by 
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critical response, even though it is also the case that in each new instance, it is required 
to be ‘new’.  Thus signature practice is not simply singular, but – apparently 
paradoxically – it is recognisably so, and coherent with the discipline, hinting at the 
presence of performance ‘regularities’, across the body of her work.  It is apparently 
challenging, but at the same time its production values are professional, hence more or 
less stable in terms of, or referencing the terms specific to external evaluation; and its 
‘newness’, when it emerges, excites rarely consistent expert commentary.    
Vanishing Point by Rosemary Butcher 
I want to note in this precise context, the mid-1980s observation from J-F 
Lyotard – sometimes known as one at least of the progenitors of the postmodern - that 
the signature artwork tends to disarm the viewer; it tends to disarm “thinking 
machines” or “representing machines” (17).  If Lyotard’s judgement is valid, something 
in that art seemed to locate itself, at its time, on the margins of written and possibly 
digital inscription.  On the other hand, in terms of professional expertise, Lyotard was 
not simply a cultural theorist, widely published  from the 1970s onwards, but his 
disciplinary field was Philosophy.  Lyotard’s mid-1980s observation as philosopher, 
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trained in expert representations and interpretations mediated by writing, was that in 
the face of art’s powers to disarm, the response of the academic and critic is to seek at 
great haste to write “twenty or one hundred pages”, in an attempt “to pick up the 
[mind’s] pieces, and [to put] the plot together again”.  That writerly picking up of the 
mind’s pieces, by the academic and critic, immediately renders our experience 
historical, and our commentary reactive.  But I’ll come back to this sort of observation 
from Lyotard. 
 
After the Last Sky by Rosemary Butcher 
In the case of Rosemary Butcher’s signature practices, these have equally been 
identified, in the early 21stC, as research, which locates them within a further set-up, 
and in epistemic terms, in a different subculture.   In Knorr Cetina’s enquiry into 
epistemic practices and research, she would tend to identify ‘the show’ that takes 
Butcher’s name as a “partial epistemic object”.  On this basis, ‘the show’ is not ‘the 
[research] thing’, and nor does ‘the show’ constitute, in itself, whatever I am 
recognising as signature: the signature of the artist, perhaps not wholly unlike the 
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signature of the named research writer, is likely, instead, to emerge with time, on the 
basis of performance or writerly regularities across the researcher’s body of work.  In 
performance-making terms, choreographic regularities tend to be identified through 
engagement with a complex, historically-differentiated practice-memory, which informs 
and conditions expert-intuitive process and decision-making, where these are equally 
conditioned by the aspiration to the new, to qualitative transformation (Massumi 2001), 
and, in Knorr Cetina’s terms, these are “undergirded” affectively.   
‘The show’, as in the case of Vanishing Point, in which Butcher shifts explicitly 
into film, is in these terms a partial ‘knowledge object,’ a “momentary instantiation” of 
a professional 30-year enquiry; it tends as ‘show’ to be responsive to requirements 
specific to the wider arts community’s economy of production, and these different 
perspectives, I am arguing, beg a number of questions as to what of, or in, ‘the show’ 
might best be documented: if, for example, ‘the show’ itself is non-identical with what 
drives it as research; if it is also non-identical with whatever drives the artist to go on 
making new work, to continue to practice as an expert practitioner; if, in professional 
terms, the artist’s need and drive to make new work are existential, as the philosopher 
Peter Osborne notes of the professional artist, then the catalogue of what ‘we’ archive 
might need at the very least to take account of some of these notions. 
 
2.4 Representing ‘signature’ in practice  
I am requiring of the digital archive, then, that it concerns itself with how to 
represent the enquiry into signature practice, into the indices of  affective investment, 
and into the practitioner’s own drive to qualitative transformation, which means, then, 
that the archive needs to enquire into its performance –disciplinary representation 
itself. At the same time, when that archive is produced within or in relation to the 
research economy of the university, I am also arguing that we need to be attentive to 
what I would call different registers of practice, in relation to this sort of ‘knowledge 
complexity’.  The encoding scheme or schemes adopted, and the meta-data that apply, 
need to take onboard, and to categorise, not only knowledge complexity, but the 
ongoing speculative nature of the enquiry.  On the other hand, to return to the case in 
point, it is likely to be the case that data available from Butcher’s work of the 1970s 
through to the 1990s will have been compromised, to the extent that the 
documentational set-up, at different historical moments, will have tended to operate in 
terms of the dominant models of intelligibility specific to the period and the sites of 
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recording.  ‘Performance histories’ are likely to be limited, at best, and are potentially 
compromised when historical data has been produced mostly from the perspective of 
spectating, the times and spaces of spectating, and not from the perspectives specific to 
expert practice in the making processes.   
What needed, historically, to have been ‘captured’, thereby becoming available 
to be “digitally inscribed” (Lyotard 1988) in the early 21stC, is something other than 
spectator-positioning in terms of ‘the show’, something other than spectator-specific 
interpretations, which tend to be based on performance effects, after the time of their 
experience, and not on expert practitioner signature practices.  According once more to 
Peter Osborne, the dominant models of intelligibility that informed perspectives from 
the 1970s onwards, replicated a schism between the communication sciences, on the one 
hand, and aesthesis, on the other.  ‘Signature practices’ in the making, and 
compositional strategies, amongst these, have as a consequence of this sort of schism, 
been systematically under-theorised in the set-ups that have dominated in the older 
university, not least under the headings of critical theory and the critique of 
representation.  
 
2.5 Signature and mediatheoretical writing 
In setting out ‘signature practices’, ‘compositional strategies’ and ‘self-
singularising practices’ as specific to expert performance-making in particular cultural 
contexts, I want to proceed to ask, today, to what extent signature practices, on the one 
hand, and self-singularisation – the notion that a work of art is one that ‘stands up by 
itself’ (Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?)– on the other, can find and take 
their place in and ‘fit with’ media-theoretical discourses in the university.  In order to 
approach the subject in the context of our concerns here, I have focused, rather 
perversely, on the mid-1980s writing of J-F Lyotard, in his collection entitled The 
Inhuman, cited in my abstract.  Lyotard’s Inhuman is subtitled, in the French, 
Causeries sur le temps, or ‘conversations about time’, and these include the times of art-
making.  I have wanted to test some of his observations against more recent publishing, 
and to that end I want to cite here Rudi Laerman and Pascal Gielen’s 2007 web-
published “The Archive of the Digital An-Archive”, as an example of writing on the 
digital/ archive, but coming out of the disciplinary set-up of the Sociology of the Arts.  
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It is of some interest, in terms of the concern with discipline that I have 
introduced here, that media-theoretical writing comes from a wide range of discipline-
specific set-ups.  Each is likely, despite this cross-disciplinary aspiration, to operate in 
terms of sometimes significantly different models of intelligibility.  It might be 
appropriate at this point to say a little more about the term ‘set-up’: by set-up I am 
referring back to Knorr Cetina’s term ‘epistemic culture’, which you will recall was 
identified in terms of “amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms which make up how 
we know what we know”, and “create and warrant knowledge”, within a disciplinary 
field (Knorr Cetina, 1999).  I want at this stage to further complexify the term by 
linking the notion of to Foucault’s observations in 1977, when he attempted to provide a 
clearer account of what he meant by the notion of an assemblage of apparatuses.   I want 
to identify the capacity of apparatuses in terms of their role in cultural production and 
reproduction.   
I am supposing that what I understand by the notion of a discipline, and of 
disciplinary specificity, is at the very least a cluster of productive and regulatory 
apparatuses and mechanisms invested with cultural values.  In the case of arts-
professional production in the cultural contexts with which performing arts specialists 
here are most familiar, these tend, as far as the artist is concerned, to be articulated in 
the first person (i.e. ‘my work’) and oriented to the performance present tense (whence 
the key question, ‘is it happening?’).  By ‘disciplinary set-up’, then, which has its 
implications for the digital archive, I am attempting to draw on what has been identified 
(Rabinow 2003) as a network of heterogeneous and loosely linked institutional 
arrangements, pre-suppositions, expectations, attitudes, laws, ways of seeing and doing, 
concern with provenance and evidence, evaluative and interpretative models and 
understandings, and so on.  Each of these plays its part in disciplinary practice.  Only 
some of these, as you are well aware, are consistently articulated discursively.  Some are 
articulated – and by articulation here I refer to a whole range of possible encodings and 
structurings –  architecturally, musically, through bodywork, through light and sound, 
through positioning and gestuality, and in terms of a relation to spectating.  The 
fuzziness of a term like ‘assemblage of apparatuses’, Rabinow notes, comes from the 
fuzziness of the rules that operate in the disciplinary set-up - which observation should 
not however inhibit those of us who operate in the very fuzzy fields of performance-
making and accounting for it.   
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3 The Discursive Set-up:  from surface to the submedial, and back again 
3.1 The Archive of the archive 
In discipline-specific terms, the  Laermans/Gielen’s “Archive of the digital an-
archive”, comes out of the Sociology of the Arts.  The writers announce an explicit 
foucauldian interest in “the law of what can be said”, as their starting-point.  In terms 
of the notion of a disciplinary set-up that I have begun to identify, their published 
article itself suggests to me that the authors write, if I might put it this way, out of 
writing itself, and out of what I would identify as a critical ‘belief in’ writing as the 
dominant knowledge-medium.  Despite a stated concern with “contemporary cyber-
reality”, their disciplinary set-up seems – again on this limited evidence -  not merely to 
privilege writing, but their text is repeatedly concerned with what they identify as the 
“ongoing discourse ‘on’ the digital archive” (my emphasis).  The archive users they 
reference, in turn, typically “read data” (my emphasis), rather than viewing it, thereby 
prioritising the orders of writing and reading; and the writers themselves openly 
observe that even in the case of “the treatment of images and sounds (both need words 
in order to become meaningful) [in archival terms]”.   
What are the implications of what I am effectively identifying as a ‘writerly set-
up’, which thematises the digital archive but approaches it through writing, and 
effectively through a belief in the natural ascendancy of writing, if you think back to my 
identification of the signature-practices of the named artist? What I am calling 
signature practice, in Butcher’s work, brings together multi-dimensional and multi-
schematic, architectural, movement-based, and performer-focused practices: these are 
twice modulated, first by her idiosyncratic take on them, and second by strategies 
specific to the logics of professional production.  As such, Butcher’s work, unlike that of 
the sociologists cited, might seem to resist writerly inscription; might even seem not to 
share their belief in writing.  In Lyotard’s terms, Butcher’s signature practices might 
equally be resistant to digital inscription – at least if the latter is pursued unreflexively.   
 
3.2 Resisting/Inscripting and the times of experience 
Lyotard’s 1980s use of the term ‘digital inscription’, on the other hand, may well 
not have come out of hands-on experience, in the mid-1980s, of digital inscription; it is 
rather more likely to have come from others’ written observations  on the digital, 
including Adorno’s observations on music, which Lyotard cites.  As far as the 21stC 
digital is concerned, then, Lyotard’s ‘conversations’ of the 1980s are ‘history’, even if, 
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as ‘progenitor of the postmodern’, he seemed, in the 1970s to be in advance of his time.  
His expertise as philosopher, as I have indicated earlier, was writing-based, and it took 
writing as its means of production as well as its outcome.  His interest in aesthetics in 
the 1980s, then, ‘comes out of’ the registers of writing specific to the discipline of 
philosophy. Writing out of writing, Lyotard tried to focus on what, according to his own 
disciplinary orientation at the time, seemed to resist a specifically writerly inscription.  
(His engagement with regard to the mid-20thC sublime, and the figural, were similarly 
identified as lying outside of writing, in the realm of the not-yet writerly – hence the 
power of art, to disarm “thinking machines” or “representing machines” (17).)   
The art-effect, that I am approaching in terms of signature practice, dis-arms, 
for Lyotard, in the way it brings uniquely together an abiding enigma and the work’s 
technicity; the greater its technicity, he argues, citing Adorno, the greater the likelihood 
that it will make itself available to digital inscription; and as a consequence, the less its 
abiding enigma is available to be grasped as such.  I have already indicated that the 
“picking up of the mind’s pieces”, by the academic and critic, would immediately 
render the initial, spectatorial engagement historical: the ‘is it happening?’, of 
Lyotard’s aesthetics, is thereby rendered as ‘it happened’.  The academic and critic, on 
this basis, are history.  The only remedy I can find in Lyotard, to apply to the case of the 
expert practitioner’s work, would be to undertake a process of documentation that 
might “mediate[…] what happens before reacting” to it.   
We might thereby begin to engage with the making processes, in advance of the 
performance event, in a set-up activated on the basis of our evaluation of the 
practitioner’s already evidenced expertise.  We should, thereby, be able, with expert 
process in mind, to begin to engage with and document ‘the work that finishes the 
work’, as Lyotard has so neatly put it. Without that engagement with the making 
processes, in the research context, the academic researcher’s attempt to seem to put the 
work back together again, after experiencing it, is likely to be other to the signature 
effect that I am targeting, and would thus  “owe[…] nothing”, in Lyotard’s words, “to 
the place [the work] can take (and which in a sense it never takes) in the intrication of 
sensory positions and intelligible meanings” specific to the practitioner’s understanding 
and undertaking.  Yet Lyotard’s wording itself remains far from unproblematical, in 
the terms I have set up today, for the simple reason that his account omits mention of 
the artist or expert practitioner her or himself from its formulation.  
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Meanwhile, Laermans and Gielen’s paper sets out observations on the 
differences between a database, which is user-need oriented and hence open to constant 
update, and an archive, which is a necessarily closed and hence stabilised database.  
They note the fairly widespread argument that ‘the digital’ and ‘the archive’ “are 
clashing notions because they refer to the basic, and opposite, characteristics of old and 
new media”, and, as a consequence, that the digital archive is differently evaluated by 
traditional archivists and ‘new media’ archive specialists.  Where their work seems to 
me to become more compelling, is in their identification of what they call the “hidden 
performativity of computer programs, which make information production 
simultaneously possible and impossible”.   
“The archive of the [digital] archive” itself, note the writers, is “not neutral”.  
They cite Wolfgang Ernst’s observation (2002) that “Behind every collection [of 
information] that is dressed up in a narrative or iconic way stands a bare technological 
structure, an archival skeleton that is with strategic consciousness withdrawn from 
discursive access on the level of the interface (…)”.  “Apparently without irreversible 
hierarchies”, they note, still citing Ernst, “the system of technical transfer and storage 
protocols is, beyond the visible surfaces, much more rigid than a traditional archive 
ever was”.  In media-theoretical terms, the writers add, “most users do not actually 
observe the […] mediating and performative role of the different sorts of programs on 
which they rely when story, retrieving or processing information”.  What is at work, the 
writers point out, at this unobserved and generally speaking unobservable level, is a 
“sub-media space within which hierarchies of carriers of signs lead into dark opaque 
depths”.  From my point of view, the writers’ uses of qualifiers like “dark”, 
“unobserved” – even “sub-” - here, seem to me to be indicative of the critical-theorist’s 
discipline-specific need to dramatise and hierarchise. 
How might we link this sort of observation back to my earlier points on the 
determinant role of set-up, in practices we might normally tend to see as ‘our own’, and 
the role of disciplinary specificity in what I might call ‘Rosemary Butcher’s work’ in 
expert performance-making?  The writers note an order of control operating in the 
digital realm that is relatively inaccessible to and unownable by the expert user.  The 
notion of the invisible, the inaccessible and the unownable, as determining to some 
significant extent  what Rosemary Butcher calls “her work”, does play its role wherever 
analysts have been intrigued by the unseen, the apparently enigmatic (as is clearly 
shown in Lyotard writing on art).  But what seems to me to be intriguing in the case of 
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the dark sub-medial space, in mediology,  is that this determining ‘player’, far from 
being invisible to all of us, emerges on the basis of industry standards, regulated by 
Relational Database Management Systems (RDBMS).    
These, as I understand it, are agreed not only between multiple authors but 
between authors and vendors of these systems, in order to maximise ‘inter-operability’ 
between systems.  The ‘enforcability’ of such standards is in some cases undertaken by 
industry standards bodies - for example the International Standards Organisation 
(ISO) - and in other cases by market forces.  All operate within a linguistic frame and 
use ‘pseudo-code’ (programming statements) which ressemble language, and 
programming algorithms which are normally stated in standard language before being 
translated into programming ‘languages’ (e.g. SQL, C++, PERL, Java).  These are 
rules-based systems, and all users, willy-nilly, rearticulate them, regardless of their own 
aspiration to digital difference. 
In this rules-based economy, and in terms of the inescapable impact of rules on 
what is produced, these standards differ significantly from the relatively fuzzy rules 
operating within what I have called disciplinary set-ups, and what Knorr Cetina has 
called ‘epistemic cultures’.  One implication of the limits on choice and potential 
imposed through a rules-based system is that in order to produce a web-site we are 
plainly limited to what can be done technically, in terms of ‘standards’ and inter-
operability.  
The performance archivist, in other words, in seeking to inscribe what is 
particular to the expert practice concerned, has a wide but strictly limited range of 
options available, but otherwise cannot intervene in the display options that these 
control.  Hence in adhering to standards, she attempts to obtain a best approximation of 
how the end user will receive the material; but that in turn means that in order to 
maximise access, she has either to produce in terms of the lowest common denominator, 
or risk excluding some users from access to the material – for example by use of 
technologies such as Flash Animation, where rich media is embedded into webpages, 
requiring of users that they install the appropriate but not universally available plug-
ins.  From my own point of view, however, I should want to add that the existence of 
constraints has not stopped artists from finding creative solutions in other media. 
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4 Expert Practices and Memory (Effects) 
The expert-performance-practitioner herself, bringing her expert recall of what 
she was looking at and staging, in the developing work, and how she then realised it in 
terms of professional production logics and production values, may well provide 
particularly valuable input to effective archive production.  Her impact, in the terms I 
have set out, lies in her ownership of and ability to recall the making processes 
themselves, as distinct from their outcome.  Yet Lyotard’s identification of the abiding 
enigma of the artwork may well apply to the artist’s own grasp of her ‘process’, not 
least in the sense that a creative ‘unknowing’ is often cited by the arts-practitioner as a 
major model of intelligibility applying to production processes: that wilfully-retained 
‘expert unknowing’ is likely to manifest itself with regard to the expert-intuitive 
operations themselves, to the impact of contingency and happy accident on production 
processes, and to the notion of what the emerging work might thematise.   
 
4.1 Temporal Syntheses and associated memory effects  
It is at this point that I have drawn again on Lyotard’s observations on time, 
memory effects and digital technologies: his terms re-engage with the philosophical 
tradition that provides his own disciplinary expertise, and his enquiry into what he 
terms “temporal syntheses” revisits Kant, on apprehension and reproduction, Bergson 
on recognition, and Freud, on memory: from the perspective of ‘preservation’ of a past 
that needs, in fact, to be reconstructed (since the cyber-realm otherwise has no 
memory), Lyotard focuses on what might be the bases for the practitioner-archivist’s 
selection of already digitised data, already delocalised and detemporalised, and on how 
simulacra – one of which is ‘the past’ itself, and another of which is ‘signature’ – are 
produced, and might be grasped auto-reflexively as well as expert-intuitively (50).  It is 
these simulacra, once constructed, that re-anchor data in a number of conceptual 
frames which trigger their own memory effects on behalf of a user. The three memory 
effects noted by Lyotard, in the mid-1980s, “coincide more or less with three very 
different sorts of temporal synthesis linked to [digital] inscription”: “breaching” 
renders the past in terms of habit, including habits of thought and feeling; it coincides 
with the identification of elements drawn together on the basis of affinity, habit or 
habit-memory.   
At issue here are questions as to what in Butcher’s past work, was and is now 
recognised as ‘dance’, of its time, and might be shown to relate to the larger arts-expert 
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contexts of the time.  “Scanning”, coinciding with remembering, in Lyotard’s own 
words, effects its own temporal synthesis and seems to evoke the experience that 
attaches to that synthesis: it “implies not only the retention of the past in the present as 
present, but the synthesis of the past as such and its reactualization as past, in the 
present (of consciousness)”.  Remembering “implies the identification of what is 
remembered through its classification in a calendar and a cartography” (51), and it is 
self-referential: “it remembers its own presuppositions and implications” (53).  
“Passing” coincides with that involuntary but often puzzling memory, which seems to 
‘come to the practitioner’: it is associated with 'working through', in the Freudian sense 
of the term.  Passing, Lyotard adds, uses up more energy than other techniques, because 
“it is a technique with no rule, or a negative rule, deregulation”.  It involves an ongoing 
‘working through’, where elements retained trigger again, in the practitioner, an 
ongoing and perhaps unanswerable enquiry. 
 
5 Interim Conclusions 
If ‘we’ are to work together, as differently-skilled expert practitioners,  on the 
digital archiving of signature creative process, I would argue that a meta-theoretical 
engagement, on the part of the expert digital practitioner, working with the artist on the 
expert-practitioner archive, is important.  First, the latter needs to be in a position to 
advise the former, as to what is most important, and what has most commonly been 
overlooked; and the former needs, on that sort of basis, to be able to trial and test 
digital solutions for disciplinary problems.  ‘We’ may need to re-invent historically 
precise set-ups, and to provide alternative perspectives with regard to missing data, if 
we are to overcome long-established and naturalised prejudice.   
The invention and the professional virtuosity of the digital practitioner are 
central here, as becomes clear as soon as we recognise that in order to archive the shift 
to practitioner expertise and experience, creative digital solutions need to be found.  
Second, the expert digital practitioner needs to learn to make explicit and therefore 
transparent to the artist, the existence and operation of rules in setting the parameters 
of the digital archive.  Third, and finally, all partners need to recognise the limits which 
the existence of a rules-bound system imposes on any attempt to archive material 
requiring a rich meta-narrative, derived through collaborative invention, if its 
complexities are to be understood by an eventual user. 
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